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Romer v. Evans:
A Legal and Political Analysis
Caren G. Dubnoff*
Introduction
Despite the Supreme Court's role as final arbiter of the "law
of the land," its power to effect social change is limited. For exam-
ple, school desegregation, mandated by the Court in 1954, was not
actually implemented until years later when Congress and the
President finally took action.1 As a result, prayer in public schools,
repeatedly deemed illegal by the Court, continues in many parts of
the country even today. 2 To some degree, whether the Court's po-
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1. Several studies have demonstrated that Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), produced little school desegregation by itself. One of the earliest
of these was J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961) (demonstrating how district court
judges evaded the decision, leaving school segregation largely in place). For a
more recent analysis, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 46-49 (1991)
(observing that Brown could not be enforced until Congress and the Presidentjoined the effort in 1964 with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). But see
CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION
AND IMPACT 257 (1984) (arguing that though Brown's direct effect was necessarily
limited because the Court lacks enforcement powers, the decision had a significant
psychological impact).
2. The Court's initial pronouncements on this issue came in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down a prayer written by New York officials for reci-
tation in the New York public schools), and Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating state-mandated Bible reading in Pennsylvania
public schools). Following these decisions, compliance with the Court's prohibition
of religious activities in public schools varied across the country. See Robert H.
Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the
'Schempp" Decision, in 1 PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1961-1992 440 (Robert Sikorski ed., 1993) (analyzing possible reasons for Tennes-
see schools' partial compliance with Schempp); KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP
E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL
PRACTICE (1971) (investigating the failure of five towns in one midwestern state to
conform to the Court's outlawing of prayer in public schools); H. Frank Way, Jr.,
Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, in 1
PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1961-1992, supra, at 457
(finding proscribed religious practices in public schools, with the exception of
Southern schools, had largely disappeared). But see WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR.,
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sition prevails in the long run is beyond its control. Presidents
may respond to the Court's actions in ways that are helpful or in
ways that impede realization of the Court's objectives. 3 Moreover,
PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 113-17 (1967)
(showing substantial implementation of the Court's mandate to remove prayer
from public schools when the school board was prodded by a local lawyer).
For further discussions regarding uneven judicial compliance with the Su-
preme Court's prohibition on religious activities in schools, see JOHNSON & CANON,
supra note 1, at 65-66 (discussing possible reasons for noncompliance by lower fed-
eral judges); KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
149-50 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing how the religious backgrounds of judges affect
their decisions regarding separation of church and state).
Express noncompliance continues to be a problem, as is demonstrated in the
case of one Kentucky principal who led his students in Christian prayer over the
public announcement system. See Attacks on the Freedom to Learn, PRESS
RELEASE (People for the American Way, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 4, 1996. In an-
other instance, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), acting on behalf of
parents and students in Santa Fe, Texas, filed suit against religious exercises in
the public schools including grade school teacher-led prayers. ACLU of Texas Files
a Complaint Against Santa Fe ISD, PRESS RELEASE (ACLU of Texas), Apr. 4, 1995.
Other school districts have attempted to avoid the Court's decisions, which
following Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), include a prohibition on school-
initiated graduation prayers by encouraging student initiated prayer. So far, poli-
cies permitting students to lead prayer during regular school hours have been
struck down by the courts. See, e.g., Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88
F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating a Mississippi statute that permitted public
school students to initiate nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer at compulsory
and noncompulsory school events); Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 887 F.
Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (enjoining a school district's practice of allowing stu-
dent organizations to broadcast prayers over the school intercom and to initiate
student-led prayer during school hours).
3. The President's ability to alter judicial policy through appointments de-
pends on how many appointments can be made, the divisions on the Court, atten-
tion given to ideology in making appointments and the willingness of the Senate to
allow the President leeway in appointments. See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 1,
at 161-62. Presidents at times have turned the Court's decisions into a political
issue. In 1968, Richard Nixon campaigned against the Court's criminal justice de-
cisions. See id. at 3-4. Nixon then used his appointment power to place men on
the Court who agreed with his position. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST
THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974) (detailing the profound
changes in criminal procedure brought about by Nixon appointees).
Presidents can affect judicial policies in other ways as well. Failure to endorse
the Court's position may provide encouragement to those who would resist it, as
Eisenhower's silence following Brown v. Board of Education apparently stalled the
process of desegregation. See PELTASON, supra note 1, at 46-55. For example, Eis-
enhower may have inadvertently encouraged Governor Faubus' resistance to de-
segregation in Little Rock. JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 1, at 157-58. Clinton
may have helped defuse the political issue generated in the Romer decision by
agreeing to the initiative barring same sex marriage, though it is believed that
Clinton's motive for supporting the ban on same sex marriages was to "blunt[ ] an
issue the Republicans had hoped to use against him in the election," not to influ-




presidential appointments can affect the composition of the Court
and allow earlier decisions to be modified or reversed.
4
Even though the Court does not have the final word on en-
forcement, it can act in ways that maximize its influence and
strengthen its power. The Court's power is weakest when its deci-
sion is opposed to a broad national consensus on a matter of pol-
icy.5 Its influence is also diminished when its decisions are weakly
argued or ambiguous because this leaves the Court vulnerable to
professional criticism which might later be exploited by political
opponents. 6 Finally, for cases which have a strong political dimen-
sion,7 the Court weakens its position when it fails to address those
objections to its action most likely to resonate in the public de-
bate.8
4. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How
THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985) (examining the im-
portance of presidential appointments on the direction of the law). Despite the
importance of presidential backing, the President is but one political actor. The
school prayer experience demonstrates the significance of support from other par-
ticipants in the political process. In the aftermath of Brown and its progeny, for
example, it mattered a great deal whether local political leaders spoke out for
compliance or instead looked the other way as school authorities followed their
own preferences. See William M. Beaney & Edward N. Beiser, Prayer and Politics:
The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, in 1 PRAYER IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1961-1992, supra note 2, at 411.
5. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, STRUGGLES
FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 180 (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that
public opinion constrains the Court from going too far or too fast). The judgment
that the Court hurts itself by going "too far, too fast" is apparently shared by Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See Linda Greenhouse, An Issue for a Reluctant High
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at E3; see also Thomas R. Marshall, The
Rehnquist Court and Public Opinion: The First Decade, Paper Given at the Ameri-
can Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 1996) (on file
with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice) (offering evidence that a
slight majority of the Rehnquist Court's rulings reflect majority popular opinion);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajori-
tarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993) (arguing that there was a strong link between public
opinion and the Court's decisions from 1956-1981 that was later weakened by the
strongly ideological appointments of Presidents Reagan and Bush). But see Hel-
mut Norpoth & Jeffrey Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (challenging Mishler & Sheehan's methodology and
conclusions).
6. See PELTASON, supra note 1, at 18 (attributing the failure to enforce deseg-
regation at least in part to the ambiguity and reasoning of Brown).
7. I refer here to those cases which receive wide attention in the media and
become the focus of partisan and interest group politics. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), is the most obvious example.
8. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEAS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 93-
114 (1985) (arguing that an approach to Roe v. Wade taking account of the con-
cerns of those who opposed abortion would have generated more acceptance); LIEF
H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 229-33 (4th ed. 1994) (arguing that the judiciary gains
1997]
Law and Inequality
This Comment analyzes one of the more highly-charged cases
of the 1996 term, Romer v. Evans,9 from both a legal and a political
perspective. In Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2) prohib-
iting all legislative, executive and judicial action designed to pro-
tect homosexuals.' 0 Amendment 2, which was approved in a
statewide referendum, overruled local laws that barred discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.1 ' Rejecting Colorado's asser-
tion that Amendment 2 merely prevented gays, lesbians or bisexu-
als from obtaining special privileges under state law, the Court's 6-
3 majority held that the law was discriminatory. 12 The Court rea-
soned that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
broadly disadvantaging an identifiable group solely because the
group is unpopular.'3 The Court held that Amendment 2 violates
the Equal Protection Clause because a state may not make a "class
of persons a stranger to its laws."'14 In dissent, Justice Scalia
(joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) accused
the majority of taking sides in "cultural debate[s]" and of exercis-
ing power in a way contrary to democratic decision making.15
legitimacy and authority through good legal reasoning which includes an open
weighing of the arguments on both sides of an issue). But see JOHNSON & CANON,
supra note 1, at 208 (arguing that there is little empirical evidence that supports
the proposition that reasoning matters).
9. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
10. Id. at 1623. The author recognizes that Amendment 2 was intended to
eliminate protections to gay man, lesbians and bisexuals; however, for clarity and
brevity, the single term "homosexuals" will be used throughout this Comment.
The reader should remain aware that the term is meant to encompass all three of
the groups targeted by Amendment 2.
11. Id. Denver, Aspen and Boulder passed legislation that protected individu-
als from discrimination due to their sexual status. Id.
12. Id. at 1624-27.
13. Id. at 1628.
14. Id. at 1629.
15. Id. A few weeks later, with the same Justices as in Romer comprising a 6-3
vote, the Supreme Court vacated a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision up-
holding a 1993 Cincinnati referendum which, like Colorado's Amendment 2, re-
pealed any existing laws protecting against discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation and barred new legislation on that subject. Equality Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996), vacating 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995). The case was remanded to the lower court for consideration not
inconsistent with Romer. Id.
Only the dissent, again charging the majority with unduly interfering with
democratic decisionmaking, wrote an opinion. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Reaf-
firming its opposition to the Romer decision, Justice Scalia nevertheless pointed
out that the circumstances in Cincinnati were distinguishable. Id. A decision in-
validating Cincinnati's charter amendment would be more intrusive on the demo-
cratic process than invalidating a state constitutional amendment since it would
overrule a decision by the lowest electoral body. Id.
[Vol. 15:275278
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From a legal standpoint, this Comment argues that while the
majority had ample justification for its ruling, it did not defend its
position as well as it should have, and as a result, Romer is open to
future attack. This Comment also takes issue with those observers
who claim Romer effected a sweeping revision of constitutional
law' 6 and critics who argue that the Court's opinion was undemo-
cratic.17 This Comment concludes that Romer neither provides
homosexuals with a broad array of rights nor endorses homosexu-
ality. The Court also did not elevate sexual orientation to a sus-
pect or semi-suspect classification as a guideline for future Four-
teenth Amendment litigation. What the Court did do in Romer
was re-enter the debate over whether the Constitution had any-
thing to say about how homosexuals should be treated. In that
sense, the Court's holding that the State cannot make homosexu-
als "strangers to its laws"'8 was very important. Homosexuals
surely ended up in a better position politically than before the de-
cision. The decision also raised questions about the continuing vi-
tality of Bowers v. Hardwick,19 a case in which the Court refused
to invalidate a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.
From a political standpoint, this Comment argues that it was
important for the Court's legitimacy for it to decide Romer nar-
rowly, in a way that did not place it far outside majority public
opinion. While the Court partially accomplished this task, it could
have made an even narrower ruling had it tracked the opinion of
the Colorado Supreme Court more closely. 20 A narrower decision
would have been just as firmly grounded in law, yet less inviting of
future litigation and less subject to political manipulation. It also
would have allowed a stronger defense in democratic theory. To
the extent the dissent's effort to portray the Court as undemocratic
16. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Strikes Anti-Gay Amendment,
CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1996, § 1, at 1.
17. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Rights Ruling Short on Guidance,
May 22, 1996, § 1, at 4 (quoting Professor Dan Polsby of Northwestern University
School of Law). "It opens up all kind of litigation possibilities. I will say this is
among the sorriest performances-as an exercise of judicial craftsmanship-that I
have ever seen from the Supreme Court." Id.; The Supreme Court Overreaches,
CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1996, § 1 (Editorial), at 16 ("[I]t is a defeat for democratic gov-
ernance that may ultimately inflame rather than erode opposition to gay rights.").
18. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
19. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy chal-
lenged under of the Due Process Clause).
20. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affig 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.
1993), afPd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). For a discussion of the Colorado Supreme
Court's reasoning, see infra Part II.B.
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and elitist can be made to stick, there will be negative future ef-
fects for the rights of homosexuals and for other minority groups.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief discussion of the po-
litical setting surrounding Romer. Its purpose is to identify the is-
sues of greatest political salience so that the Court's response to
them can be evaluated. Part II sets out the legal issues involved in
the decision and summarizes the reasoning of both the majority
opinion and of the dissent. Part III provides a legal and political
critique of Romer. Finally, Part IV offers suggestions on how the
Court could have made a stronger argument, again from the per-
spectives of both law and politics. This Comment concludes that
although Romer was correctly decided, the majority opinion was
not argued as persuasively as it might have been, and this short-
coming may have negative future consequences for the civil rights
of minorities.
I. Political Setting
Romer was about more than the civil rights of homosexuals.
It was part of a larger argument over the proper role of religion
and family values in public policy making. As with abortion, the
gay civil rights debate2' often has led to partisan political feuds.22
In recent years, a growing number of states and local com-
munities have adopted policies prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation in public accommodations, employment, insur-
ance and education. 23 The referendum movements, such as the
21. As with "homosexual," the term "gay civil rights" is meant to refer to the
legal interests of those targeted by Amendment 2, namely gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals.
22. See e.g., Katia Hetter, The New Civil Rights Battle: The Supreme Court
Hands Gays a Win in the Struggle Between Tolerance and Tradition, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 3, 1996, at 28 (anticipating that social conservatives would use
the Court's ruling to "energize their grass-roots activists and make homosexuality
a wedge issue in the [fall 1996 election] campaign"). Id.
Some Republicans saw political gain whichever way the Court went. At the
May 3-4 meeting of the New England Political Science Association, Hadley Arkes,
an Amherst professor and prominent supporter of the anti-gay initiatives, antici-
pated that the Court would strike down Amendment 2. He expressed the hope
that the decision would be sweeping, in which case he believed that it would pro-
duce a realignment toward the Republican party similar to the one provoked by
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Laws barring employment discrimination against homosexuals have been
enacted in nine states: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin and Rhode Island. See Eric Schmitt, Anti-
Discrimination Proposal Delays Senate Vote on Bill Opposing Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at A24. A similar measure narrowly failed to pass the
Senate. See The Senate's Vote on Gay Rights, supra note 3, at A34. For a thor-
ough review of the law in this area, see Robert B. Mison et al., Sexual Orientation
[Vol. 15:275280
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one that produced Amendment 2, are strategic attempts by anti-
gay forces to reverse this trend.24 In Colorado, the referendum
was designed to remove the power of local governments to include
gay men, lesbians and bisexuals within the protection of their anti-
discrimination laws.25 Amendment 2 also would have cemented
the anti-gay policy by requiring that future changes be made only
by constitutional amendment rather than conventional legisla-
tion.2 6
The campaign for Colorado's Amendment 2 was waged
largely on the theme of repealing "special rights" for homosexu-
als.2 7 Amendment 2's supporters put forth the proposition that
anti-discrimination laws provided "special rights" for the listed
groups, while suggesting that protection from discrimination was
unavailable to anyone not listed. 28 The impression of "specialness"
was reinforced by Amendment 2's references to "protected status,"
"minority status" and "quota preferences"-all code words evoca-
tive of affirmative action.2 9 The "special rights" label allowed pro-
Discrimination in the Workplace: A Legal Reference Guide, 1 NAT'L J. SEXUAL
ORIENTATION L. 33, 50-76 (1995) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw/>.
24. Jurisdictions in which similar amendments had been voted on or were
pending include Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon and Washington. See Daniel J.
Garfield, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-
Only Amendments, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 690, 691 n.7.
25. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate over
Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 137
n.1 (1995).
26. See Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen
Initiatives: Is Constitutionalism Unconstitutional?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 93, 96 (1995).
27. See Marcosson, supra note 25, at 138-39 nn.6-7 (pointing out the impor-
tance of the "special rights" label to strategy and electoral success of initiative
campaigns).
28. See Hubert Morken, "No Special Rights": The Thinking Behind Colorado's
Amendment #2 Strategy, Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association 6 (Sept. 1-4, 1994) (on file with the Journal of Law & Inequal-
ity: A Journal of Theory and Practice) (quoting Anton Marco, co-founder of Colo-
rado for Family Values, the organization that initiated Amendment 2, as pointing
out that "almost everyone gets fired sometime or other in their lifetime"). Cf.
Duncan & Young, supra note 26, at 94 n.7 ("[Hlomosexuals already have the same
rights everyone else has-the right to be protected against discrimination on the
basis of their race, gender, religion, age, and disability."); Marcosson, supra note
25, at 140 ("For example, if gay men and lesbians were granted the right to commit
murder, that would be a 'special right' in the sense that it is not possessed by het-
erosexuals.").
29. Amendment 2 provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regula-
tion, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
1997]
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ponents of Amendment 2 to maintain that they were not hostile to
homosexuals, but only supportive of "fairness" to all by eliminating
"special rights" for some.30 This argument proved politically po-
tent to many centrist voters who did not fall clearly into either the
anti-gay or gay civil rights camps.3' Such voters can be described
as opposed to discrimination in employment and public accommo-
dations, but hostile to anything perceived as "preferences."
32
Opponents of gay civil rights made a number of other argu-
ments in support of Amendment 2. For example, Amendment 2
was described as a cost-cutting measure, as important to the main-
tenance of community order, as promoting family autonomy, as
advancing religious liberty and as protective of children from psy-
chological and physical harm.3 3 By the time the case reached the
United States Supreme Court, however, the significance of some of
these arguments had begun to wane among practitioners34 and the
tion, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimina-
tion. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (emphasis added).
30. Anton Marco, co-founder of Colorado for Family Values, a leading propo-
nent of Amendment 2, champions a similar approach called the "silent solution."
See Morken, supra note 28, at 1. Marco would have government adopt a "neutral
silence that refuses to grant homosexuals preferred status ... yet maintains equal
protection for all persons." Id. at 7. The politically important "special rights" ar-
gument proved central in the ensuing litigation as well. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy identified it as Colorado's "principal argument." Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996). Justice Scalia incorporated much of the "special
rights" rhetoric into his dissent. See, e.g., id. at 1630 ("The amendment prohibits
the special treatment of homosexuals, and nothing more."); see also infra Part II.D.
It is not difficult to foresee that the argument over "special rights" will endure
as an important component of anti-discrimination cases. In objecting to the Su-
preme Court's grant of certiorari in a case involving a city charter amendment
similar to Colorado's constitutional amendment, Justice Scalia expressed his belief
that "the people [may] decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord special protec-
tion to homosexuals." Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,
116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. See Marcosson, supra note 25, at 138 n.6.
32. Id; cf. Morken, supra note 28, at 7 ("Some moderates reject the whole civil
rights emphasis on group rights and see voting yes on Amendment 2 as their op-
portunity to stop the further expansion of legal entitlements.").
33. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d. 1335, 1339-40 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996).
34. Colorado did not assert the child protection rationale, arguably the most
emotionally-charged argument, before the Court. See Evans, 882 P.2d. at 1340
n.2. The Court summarily rejected Colorado's other justifications-that Amend-
ment 2 protected "other citizens' freedom of association" and "conserv[ed Colo-
rado's] resources to fight discrimination against other groups"-saying, "[Tihe
breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications




public 35 alike. An argument that remained important involved the
position of homosexuals in society as a disadvantaged minority. 36
Proponents of Amendment 2 argued that because homosexuals
were economically "privileged" they did not need the protection of
anti-discrimination laws.3 7 For example, the leading supporter of
Amendment 2 argued that "gays are one of the most privileged
groups in the country, sporting average annual household incomes
over $55,000."38 In the context of the litigation, the fictitious eco-
35. Proponents of Amendment 2 may have been following the lead of Anton
Marco. He believed that the "special rights" description of anti-discrimination
laws justified the amendment far more effectively in the political arena than other
arguments. See Morken, supra note 28, at 4, 9. Support for Amendment 2 de-
clined when, against Marco's advice, the moral arguments based on disapproval of
homosexuality were given greater prominence. Id. at 4. Moreover, Marco took the
defeat of Oregon's similar (though more morally condemning) initiative as proof of
his assessment's validity because proponents of Oregon's initiative utilized a mor-
ally-based strategy. Id.
36. See Brief for Petitioner at 42, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039) (defending Colorado's conclusion that gay men and lesbians are
"politically powerful and relatively privileged"). The continued salience of this ar-
gument is understood as a rational response to prevailing equal protection doc-
trine. By casting gays and lesbians as privileged, proponents of Amendment 2
complicated the legal argument for their opponents because equal protection juris-
prudence has for some time been influenced by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's now
famous "footnote 4" in Carolene Products. See United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that judicial invalidation of legis-
lative line-drawing is particularly justified where political action disadvantaging a
"discrete and insular" minority renders the political process defective). Though
minority status is no longer the only trigger to heightened scrutiny by the Su-
preme Court, minority status, disadvantage and a history of discrimination still
serve as prominent triggers to Court attention to classifications under equal pro-
tection. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
37. See Morken, supra note 28, at 6, 9 (discussing Marco's use of this argu-
ment). Cincinnati voters recently approved a city charter amendment similar to
Colorado's Amendment 2 in its objective and wording. See Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 422 (1994), affd in
part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). Pro-
fessor James David Woodward, a political scientist at Clemson University, testi-
fied in defense of the charter amendment that gays, lesbians and bisexuals were
not politically powerless because of their affluence, education and intense feelings
on certain political issues. Id. at 426.
38. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding
the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 292 (1994) (quoting
Will Perkins, Executive Chairman of the Board of Colorado for Family Values).
But see Eric Heinze, Gay and Poor, 38 HOW. L.J. 433 (1995) (asserting that "gays
are economically disadvantaged in the United States due to "direct" and "indirect"
discrimination"); cf. M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 726 (1995) (finding significant wage dispar-
ity between homosexual and heterosexual men of similar education, experience




nomic well-being of homosexuals was used to argue that judicial
protection was unjustified.39
Once Amendment 2 moved to litigation, the fact that it had
passed by referendum 40 allowed anti-gay forces to emphasize the
right of the people to govern themselves. Referendum supporters
argued that gay civil rights policy was a matter that rightly be-
longed to the "people," not to a court of unelected officials.
4 1
Amendment 2's proponents hoped to persuade the Court to defer
to the judgment of the Colorado electorate. 42 The immediate pub-
lic reaction suggested that at least part of this populist argument
had some influence. 43
Another argument likely to be important in the larger politi-
cal debate for similar reasons is Justice Scalia's claim, made in the
dissent, that the Court has taken sides in a "culture war."44 Court
interventions aimed at assuring an open and fair political process
carry a much greater legitimacy than court actions which seem to
take a position on substantive policy.45
39. See Brief for Petitioner at 42 n.30, Romer (No. 94-1039).
40. Amendment 2 passed by a vote of 813,966 (53.4%) to 710,151 (46.6%) on
November 3, 1992. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993).
41. See Duncan & Young, supra, note 26, at 97. "Grassroots initiatives like
Amendment Two are the product of a populist revolt against restrictive homosex-
ual rights laws." Id. at 134. See also Morken, supra note 28, at 7 (arguing for
democratic legal reform rather than "government intrusion into what ought to be
left to private opinion and the negotiations of the market").
42. See Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, 10, Romer (No. 94-1039). "[Tlhe people ap-
proved Amendment 2 after a spirited campaign which the trial court found to be a
classic example of democratic self-government." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). "The
reasoning of the [Colorado Supreme Court] does profound violence to settled un-
derstandings of the authority of, and respect for, popular government at the state
level." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
43. Cf. supra note 17 (discussing the reaction of a Northwestern University
School of Law professor).
44. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996).
45. Court actions that defend democracy have the greatest legitimacy. Studies
repeatedly conclude that the Supreme Court is most likely to be followed when its
decision taps into a long held public value, even if the value has not been imple-
mented. For example, one commentator attributed the ultimate ability of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to persuade Congress to join in effect-
ing social change to the fact that "Brown carried with it the moral conscience of
the American people." HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 469 (1988).
Similarly, David M. O'Brien, a well-known scholar of the Court, has observed: "At
its best, the Court appeals to the country to respect the substantive value choices
of human dignity and self-governance embedded in our written Constitution."
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
321 (1986).
Much of the debate surrounding proper modes of constitutional interpretation
starts from the proposition that the Court's power becomes suspect when it ques-
tions the actions of the majority. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
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The "special rights" and governance arguments put forth
were for both public consumption and to persuade the Court of the
constitutionality of Amendment 2.46 The legal argument, however,
was for the Court alone; it was, and had to be, more complicated
because it needed to address the prevailing standards under the
equal protection doctrine. For example, proponents of Amendment
2 needed to argue the proper standard of review, a matter little
understood within, and of little relevance for, the public debate. A
discussion of these arguments follows.
I. The Decision
A. Constitutional Environment
The core legal issue in Romer was whether Amendment 2
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "No State shall
.. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." 47 The core principle of the Equal Protection Clause is,
as Justice Kennedy stated in Romer, a "commitment to the law's
neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake."48 This means
that government must treat those who are similarly situated the
same.49 There are two basic ways in which this constitutional pro-
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed.
1986) (describing this problem as the "countermajoritarian difficulty"). John Hart
Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement was designed to resolve this difficulty
by confining legitimate Court decision-making to correcting defects in the demo-
cratic process. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 77-80, 101-04, 135-79 (1980). For a defense of Ely's position, see
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 768-819 (1991).
Some of Ely's critics would accept representation-reinforcement as legitimate
only if coupled with a theory protective of fundamental liberties. See, e.g., Lau-
rence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980). The view that Court action removing defects in
the democratic process is especially justified originated in Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone's footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
See Klarman, supra, at 749 (calling the footnote "the seminal statement of political
process theory"); see also supra note 36 (discussing the now famous footnote 4 in
more detail).
46. See supra notes 27-28, 30 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
48. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
49. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, at 7 (2d ed. 1992). This formulation of
the Fourteenth Amendment principle and the similar equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment appears, with some minor wording variations, in several
cases. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
("[Tihe classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
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tection can be violated.50 First, "equality can be denied when gov-
ernment classifies so as to distinguish, in its rules or programs, be-
tween persons who should be regarded as similarly situated in
terms of the relevant equal protection principles."5 1 In addition,
"equality can be denied when government fails to classify with the
result that its rules or programs do not distinguish between per-
sons who, for equal protection purposes, should be regarded as dif-
ferently situated."52
There often is difficulty, however, in determining whether an
apparent difference in situations is meaningful or not. Problems
also arise in attempting to draw lines with such precision that only
those-and all those-who share the characteristics important to
the achievement of the government's ends will be singled out by
legislation.53 Because of these difficulties, a legislature must be
given broad latitude if it is to successfully assess a social problem,
weigh competing concerns and remedy the ill.54 Thus, if govern-
ment is to function effectively it must classify citizens even though
the unavoidable result is that some individuals will be treated less
favorably than others.55
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the leg-
islation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.");
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517 (1973) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
that "individuals similarly situated must receive the same treatment by the Gov-
ernment").




53. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 539 (2d ed. 1991).
The author describes the equal protection difficulties inherent in statutory con-
struction as follows:
For almost in all cases, the classifications will not be perfectly efficient,
but will be either "overinclusive" or "underinclusive" or both. A classifica-
tion is "overinclusive" if it disadvantages some people who do not in fact
threaten the state's interest. It is "underinclusive" if some people are not
disadvantaged even though they threaten the state's interest.
Id. The legislative determination of the age at which one can drive a car provides
a good example. Presumably, the primary objective is to foster traffic safety.
Whatever the age set, there will be some individuals who would be safe drivers
although they are younger than the set age and there will be some individuals over
the set age who are unsafe drivers.
54. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 ("A legislature must have substantial lati-
tude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the prob-
lem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and
that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every
ill.").
55. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (arguing that the prac-
tical problems of effective governing may justify a classification even if in practice
it results in some inequality).
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To address the need "to reconcile the principle with the real-
ity"56 as well as the need to minimize the Court's intrusion into the
political process, the Court has developed an analytic framework
for assessing claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Until the
1940s, the Equal Protection Clause was effectively invoked only as
a protection against discrimination based on race or national ori-
gin.57 From the 1940s to the 1970s, the Court employed a two-
tiered analytic approach. Most classifications were upheld as long
as they were reasonable, and the Court deferred to the legislative
or executive judgment as to what was reasonable.58 Government
action assessed under this "rational basis" test was permissible if
there was any conceivable basis for it.9 Most classifications were
reviewed under this rationality standard; under such deferential
review, invalidation of legislation was rare. 60 However, no similar
56. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
57. The first case to invalidate a racial classification was Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating a West Virginia law that limited jury duty
to white males), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Shortly
thereafter, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause protected Chinese ali-
ens residing in San Francisco from discrimination in the administration of the law.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding Yick Wo's imprisonment for
violation of a San Francisco ordinance barring laundries in wooden buildings with-
out a variance to be invalid because only Chinese were denied such variances).
At the same time, however, the Court often allowed classifications based on
race and national origin that were disadvantageous to minorities. The best known
example of this is Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Lousiana
law that required the separation of the races on railroad cars), overruled by Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Plessy set into motion the "separate but
equal" era, a period in which the Court's view of the equality prong was often
strained. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528
(1899) (finding no equal protection violation in a decision by Richmond County,
Georgia to fund a white but not a black high school, thereby denying black school
children an opportunity to receive a high school education).
58. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a
New York traffic regulation prohibiting advertising on business vehicles but per-
mitting an exception for vehicles operated by the owner of the business being ad-
vertised).
59. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a
law that required opticians, but not sellers of ready-to-wear glasses, to obtain a
prescription before replacing a customer's glasses); McGowen v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding, with an extremely deferential review, exemptions for
some businesses from Sunday closing laws). The Court has not always used such
deferential language, however. In F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920), the Court asserted that to be rational the classification had to
have a "fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation." Id.
(upholding a Virginia tax law that distinguished between businesses that had
some dealings within the state and those whose operations were conducted wholly
outside the state).
60. One of the exceptions was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidating
an Illinois statute regulating "currency exchanges" but exempting the American
Express Company), overruled by City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
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presumption of constitutionality existed when the government
used a classification that the Court had designated as "suspect"
61
or when government action affected the exercise of a "fundamental
right."62 In those circumstances, the Court has required the State
to demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in the classifica-
(1976). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking
down an Alabama tax scheme that favored its own residents).
61. The notion that some types of classifications may be "suspect" and require
heightened scrutiny has its origin in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1994). Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated that "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. The Court went
on, however, to uphold the removal of Japanese-Americans from designated mili-
tary zones without requiring the evidence that strict scrutiny would seem to re-
quire. Id. at 219.
Since Korematsu, the Court has been more rigorous in applying the strict
scrutiny standard, invalidating almost all classifications that come under it. See,
e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (invalidating a Florida Court order
awarding custody to the father of a child when the mother became involved in an
interracial marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Vir-
ginia's laws against interracial marriage).
62. The first such decision was Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(striking down on equal protection grounds Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterili-
zation Act, which required that persons convicted two or more times of felonies be
sterilized but exempted those convicted of embezzlement and other "white collar"
crimes from such punishment). Like the right to procreate, access to the ballot
was deemed a fundamental interest warranting heightened scrutiny in later cases.
See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating election
where voting rights were limited to property owners); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969) (striking down a Louisiana law limiting voting rights to prop-
erty owners); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(striking down a New York law limiting voting in school board elections to parents
or property owners); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(striking down a poll tax). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding a statutory scheme limiting voting
rights in water storage districts to landowners).
The right to travel interstate was recognized as fundamental in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down various state statutes prohibiting
welfare benefits to residents of less than one year as violative of their right to in-
terstate movement), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 416 U.S.
1000 (1974). The right to travel interstate played a part along with concern for
ballot access in the invalidation of a Tennessee year-long residency requirement
for voting in Dunn v. Blurnstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Access to the courts has also been treated as fundamental in some circum-
stances. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that indigent criminal
defendants can not be denied appellate review allowed other defendants because
they lack the means to pay for a transcript); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (invalidating Connecticut's refusal to waive court costs for indigent couples
seeking a divorce because the interest involved, i.e., marriage, is fundamental). As
recently as 1996, the Court struck down a Mississippi requirement making the ap-
peal of a judgment terminating parental rights contingent upon the advance pay-
ment of $2,352.36. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
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tion, and that the means it selected were narrowly tailored to ef-
fect that interest.63
If the Court still used this two-tiered approach, the plaintiffs
in Romer would have had to convince the Court either that sexual
orientation should be considered a suspect classification or that
Amendment 2 limited a fundamental right. There were three rea-
sons why it was unlikely that the Romer Court would add sexual
orientation to the suspect classification category. First, the Court
had already indicated its great reluctance to broaden the suspect
classification category in its analysis of gender and illegitimacy.64
Second, such a holding might seem to be in direct conflict with the
Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,65 although that case turned
on the Due Process Clause.66 Third and most importantly, desig-
nating sexual orientation a suspect classification would transform
laws throughout the nation and surely cause political turmoil.
Such a course was not one this fairly cautious Court was likely to
take.67 Foregoing a suspect classification argument and instead
convincing the Court that Amendment 2 encroached on a funda-
mental right seemed the more promising approach.68
However, this two-tiered analysis has given way to a more
complicated system. In the 1970s, the Court created an interme-
diate level of review. Originating with gender classifications, the
63. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). The strict scrutiny
standard as been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
64. This reluctance with regard to illegitimates can be seen in Labine v Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding state intestate succession statutes that fa-
vored legitimate over illegitimate children). Rather broaden the suspect classifica-
tion category, the Court has applied an intermediate level of review to these
classifications. This new standard, which the Court has described as falling
somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis review, was openly acknowl-
edged in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that a statute that clas-
sifies based on gender "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). Although not recognized
until Craig, the standard was actually used in earlier decisions such as Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (invalidating Idaho probate code provision that pref-
erences men over women in appointment as administrator of an estate).
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66. In Bowers, the Court held that a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though the law
applied to all sodomy, the majority focused on whether the right of privacy ex-
tended to provide homosexuals with a fundamental right to engage in gay sex. Id.
at 190.
67. See infra notes 190-202 and accompanying text; see also TRIBE, supra note
50, § 16-3, at 1445.
68. A fundamental rights argument did persuade the trial court and the Colo-
rado Supreme Court. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
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notion has been extended to other categories. 69 For classifications
falling within this intermediate category, government must dem-
onstrate an "important" interest and a "substantial" relationship of
the classification to the interest.70
Moreover, rational basis review itself has been refined. No
longer does the rational basis test automatically result in the vali-
dation of the government's action.71 There have been circum-
stances, although not clearly defined, in which the Court has been
less willing than it once was to credit the legitimacy of government
purposes.7 2  Obviously, whatever the framework, the "special
rights" controversy in Romer was pivotal; 73 if Amendment 2 had
been viewed as not treating homosexuals unfavorably, then none
of the equal protection criteria would have applied.
B. Procedural History
Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 in November 1992.74
Shortly thereafter Richard Evans, along with several other indi-
viduals and adversely affected local governmental entities, peti-
tioned the Denver district court for an order declaring Amendment
2 unconstitutional and an injunction barring its enforcement.7 5
69. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-33, at 1610.
70. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 (striking down an Oklahoma statute
barring the sale of 3.2% beer to males, but not to females, under the age of twenty-
one); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down an Illinois law that
prevented children born out of wedlock from inheriting from their fathers unless
paternity had been acknowledged in a judicial proceeding prior to the father's
death).
71. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(holding that unrelated persons occupying one household could not be denied food
stamps).
72. Compare Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (where
the court strongly deferred to a New York traffic regulation prohibiting advertising
on business vehicles but making an exception for vehicles operated in the business
of the owner), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(holding the City's denial of a use permit for a group home for mentally retarded.
individuals violated the equal protection clause). For a further discussion of the
Court's enhanced rational basis test, see Part III.A.
73. For a discussion of the "special rights" controversy, see infra Part III.C.
74. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1620, 1623 (1996). The cities of Aspen, Boul-
der and Denver had ordinances that protected gays and lesbians which were con-
sequently repealed by Amendment 2. Id. Amendment 2 repealed all laws and
policies barring discrimination of homosexuals and forbidding the adoption of "all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the named class." Id.
75. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (Evans I) (explaining
the plaintiffs' request that the court "enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 2" and




As already suggested, Evans first had to convince the Court
that there had been discrimination against gay men, lesbians and
bisexuals. Because the more traditional and widely used rational
basis test generally results in deference to voters and the legisla-
ture, Evans and his co-plaintiffs next had to persuade the Court to
apply some form of heightened scrutiny.
76
At the Denver district court, Evans argued that a classifica-
tion based on sexual orientation should be considered suspect or
quasi-suspect.77 Alternatively, Evans argued that the court should
use rational basis review and that "the state's purported compel-
ling interests are not rationally related to the enactment of
Amendment 2."78 The trial court refused to place sexual orienta-
tion in the suspect category;79 however, it still held that strict scru-
tiny was warranted because Amendment 2 burdened the funda-
mental right "not to have the State endorse and give effect to
private biases."80  The trial court concluded that Amendment 2
must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard.8 1 Because
there was a reasonable probability plaintiffs would prevail under
that standard, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
preventing enforcement of Amendment 2 pending a trial on the
merits.8 2 Colorado appealed.8 3
76. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis
review as a traditionally deferential standard); but see supra notes 69-70 and ac-
companying text (explaining that rational basis no longer automatically results in
deference to the government).
77. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994) (Evans II), affd, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
78. Id. at 1341; see also Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1273.
79. Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1341 n.3 (noting that the trial court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that sexual orientation is a suspect class because that group is
not politically powerless).
80. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1274.
81. Id. The court stated, "A legislative enactment which infringes on a funda-
mental right or which burdens a suspect class is constitutionally permissible only
if it is 'necessary to promote a compelling state interest'... and does so in the least
restrictive manner possible." Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1341 (citing Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)).
Under prevailing Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Court looks more
closely at some classifications than at others. See supra notes 55, 59 and accom-
panying text (identifying suspect classifications). Under strict scrutiny, the state
must show a compelling interest and a means closely tailored to that interest. See
supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (explaining strict scrutiny and the bur-
den of proof it imposes on the government). Strict scrutiny is applied if the classi-
fication is one the Court has designated as suspect or if the interest regulated is
fundamental. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (explaining when
strict scrutiny applies).
82. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1273.
83. Id. at 1274.
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The Colorado Supreme Court's first review of the case (Evans
1) focused on the standard of review. The state supreme court
agreed with the trial court's finding that Amendment 2 implicated
a fundamental right and even recharacterized it as a fundamental
right to have an equal voice in government.84 The supreme court
remanded the case to the district court "to determine whether
[Amendment 2] is constitutionally valid under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."8 5  On remand, the trial court held that the State
failed to meet its heavy burden under the strict scrutiny test.
8 6
Colorado offered a number of additional justifications for Amend-
ment 2, each of which the trial court dismissed as either not com-
pelling or not necessary to the interest at stake.8 7
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed its Evans I
holding regarding the standard of review.88 It also agreed with the
trial court's disposition on the merits. Although acknowledging
that some of the interests Colorado advanced were compelling, the
Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Amend-
ment 2 was not narrowly tailored to effect those ends.8 9 Thus,
while the supreme court recognized that the State had a compel-
ling interest in religious liberty, it reasoned that "an equally effec-
tive, and substantially less onerous way of accomplishing that
purpose simply would be to require that anti-discrimination laws
84. Id. at 1276.
85. Id. at 1286.
86. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1340-41 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996).
87. Id. at 1339-40. Colorado asserted the following compelling interests:
(1) deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's politi-
cal functions; (3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimina-
tion against suspect classes; (4) preventing the government from inter-
fering with personal, familial, and religious privacy; (5) preventing
government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest
group; and (6) promoting the physical and psychological well-being of
Colorado children.
Id. at 1339. The trial court held these either not compelling or not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the purported objectives. Id.
88. Id. at 1341.
89. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed each of the State's claims de twvo.
Id. at 1341-50. It agreed with the trial court's position that the State's asserted
interests were either insufficiently compelling or were achievable by less intrusive
means. See id. (detailing which state interests were insufficiently compelling or
too intrusive). For example, the asserted interest in religious freedom was com-
pelling but was not the least restrictive means because religious freedom could be




which include provisions for sexual orientation also include excep-
tions for religiously-based objections."90
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that although
the State might have a compelling interest in protecting family
privacy, the interest was not implicated in the case at hand.91
Moreover, such an interest would not extend to having the State
endorse one set of moral values over another.92 Additionally, the
court was not convinced that Amendment 2 was justified as a nec-
essary means for protecting associational privacy.93 Unmoved by
these arguments and others,94 the Colorado Supreme Court dis-
missed the State's justifications as not compelling.95
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the United States Supreme
Court, began his remarks in Romer v. Evans by invoking Justice
John Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson-'-"the Constitution
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens"96 -followers of
the case must have anticipated that Evans would win. Continu-
ing, Justice Kennedy explained that these words signify a
"commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons
are at stake."97 However, those who thought the reference meant
that sexual orientation would be treated as a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny were mis-
taken.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Supreme
Court's result, but it did so on quite different grounds. Whereas
the Colorado Supreme Court had subjected Amendment 2 to a
searching review, which Amendment 2 failed, the U.S. Supreme
Court not only held that Amendment 2 failed constitutional analy-
90. Id. at 1343.
91. Id. at 1343-44.
92. Id. at 1343.
93. Id. at 1344-45. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that Amendment 2
prohibited protection of gays and lesbians in activities that had little or no connec-
tion to intimate relationships. Id. at 1345.
94. The court stated that "the preservation of fiscal resources, administrative
convenience, and the reduction of the workload of governmental bodies" were not
compelling interests. Id.
95. Id.
96. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (upholding a Louisiana law that
required the separation of races on railroad cars), overruled by Brown v. Board of




sis98 but also that it "was not within our constitutional tradition to
enact" the law.99 Whereas the state supreme court agreed that
some of Colorado's justifications were compelling even though it
held that they could be advanced less intrusively, 0 0 the U.S. Su-
preme Court did not take the State's justifications seriously be-
cause they were too far removed from Amendment 2 itself.1 1
Section I of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion provided a
straightforward account of the law's provisions and the history of
the litigation. 0 2 The substantive analysis began in Section II with
the consideration and rejection of Colorado's "special rights"
claim.'0 3 The Court stated that the State's assertion that Amend-
ment 2 did no more than put homosexuals "in the same position as
all other persons" was "implausible."'' 0 4 There was the undeniable
fact that Amendment 2 placed gays, lesbians and bisexuals in a
less favorable position than they had been before its adoption. 0 5
Moreover, the harm imposed was extensive, as documented by the
state supreme court. 10 6
The Court then explained that civil rights laws cannot be
viewed as providing "special" advantages to those covered because
in most cases, people do not face arbitrary exclusions from every-
day activities. 0 7 This presumption of non-discrimination is re-
flected in the common law rule that "innkeepers, smiths, and oth-
ers who 'made profession of a public employment,' were prohibited
from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer."'' 0 While
this rule might have served the majority well enough, it was often
insufficient to protect some identifiable and unpopular groups. 10 9
Civil rights laws were designed to cope with this sort of group dis-
advantaging.1n °
98. Id. at 1627.
99. Id. at 1628.
100. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
101. 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
102. Id. at 1623-24.
103. Id. at 1624-25. The State's "special rights" claim asserted that Amendment
2 "does no more than deny homosexuals special rights." Id. at 1624.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1625. The Court explained that the "amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1627.
108. Id. at 1625 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2346 (1995)).
109. Id.
110. See id. (explaining that Colorado's state and municipal laws "enumerate
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Furthermore, Justice Kennedy noted that Amendment 2 also
repealed regulations forbidding discrimination based on sexual
orientation in public employment."1 Even though he did not ex-
plain the importance of this point, the argument responded to
Colorado's claim, implicit in the "special rights" argument, that
Amendment 2 incorrectly placed the right to be free from discrimi-
nation ahead of the liberty rights of those who wished to discrimi-
nate. 1" 2 Finally, Justice Kennedy wrote that Amendment 2 denied
homosexuals the "safeguards others enjoy."" 3 Moreover, unlike
others gay men, lesbians and bisexuals could only secure equal
rights by amending the state constitution or "by trying to pass
helpful laws of general applicability;"" 4 that is, laws barring the
arbitrary disadvantaging of any individual.
Having argued that Amendment 2 did indeed harm homo-
sexuals, the Court then turned its attention to the case's second
principal issue: whether such harm is barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 115 It is worth repeating that notwithstanding Justice
Kennedy's opening remarks, the Court has never required the
government to act with perfect neutrality." 6 As Justice Kennedy
acknowledged, if government is to function effectively, it must
classify citizens, even though the unavoidable, result is that some
groups will be treated less favorably than others. 117 The need "to
the groups or persons" which the laws protect and that these groups are not lim-
ited to those which receive heightened equal protection scrutiny in the courts).
111. Id. at 1626. The Court explained the breadth of Amendment 2 by stating
that it applies to public employment, public accommodations and various private
transactions. Id.
112. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996) (explaining the defendants' argument that private citizens, such as land-
lords, would have to unfairly compromise their "deep-seated and profound relig-
ious objections to homosexuality" in order to comply with the amendment).
113. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Justice Kennedy summed up the Court's posi-
tion as follows:
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds.
These are protections taken for granted by most people either because
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors




116. See discussion supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing judi-
cial review of equal protection claims and explaining that if the government satis-
fies the applicable constitutional standard, then it may use a given classification,
even if that classification has uneven or non-neutral effects).
117. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. The Court explained that while the require-
ment of a "link between classification and objective" guides and limits government
action, ordinarily a "law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate
government interest, even if the law ... works to the disadvantage of a particular
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reconcile the principle with the reality""l 8 led the Court to develop
the two-tiered analytic approach described previously: If a law ei-
ther burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class then
the Court should examine it using strict scrutiny; if not, then the
Court need only ensure that the classification "bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate end."119
However, given the exceptional nature of Amendment 2, the
Court perceived no need to utilize its traditional two-tiered ana-
lytic framework nor did it need to explicitly invoke either strict
scrutiny or a rational basis test. Instead, the Court implicitly drew
elements from each. It was important that Amendment 2 affected
participation in the political process, but the Court's decision was
not grounded in the fundamental rights component of equal pro-
tection analysis. In fact, if it had been, the Court indicated that it
might go further than had the Colorado Supreme Court.
Whereas the state supreme court took the position that a law
limiting the exercise of one's "fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process" would be invalid unless justified by
a compelling interest and by a means necessary to promote that
interest, 120 Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest that such a law was
never permissible. 121 Although it was also important that the law
was aimed at an identifiable and unpopular group, 122 the Court
avoided holding that sexual orientation was a suspect classifica-
tion calling for strict scrutiny.123 Finally, the Court considered the
breadth of the inflicted harm to be an important factor. 124
The Court noted that under ordinary circumstances, "a law
will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate govern-
ment interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disad-
vantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenu-
ous."'125 However, even deferential analysis implies the pursuit of
group." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. See also discussion supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
120. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993), affd, 882 P.2d 1335
(Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
121. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
remarked that a law which makes it "more difficult for one group of citizens than
for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection
of the laws in the most literal sense." Id.
122. See id. at 1628.
123. Id. at 1629. Rather than imposing strict scrutiny, the Court only applied
rational basis review to Amendment 2, and it held that the law was not "directed
to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective." Id.
124. See id. Completely denying protection of the laws to a group of persons
based upon one trait is "unprecedented in our jurisprudence." Id.
125. Id. at 1627 (citation omitted).
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a legitimate end.126 Moreover, the state may not be partial for its
own sake, and it may not pass a law "for the purpose of disadvan-
taging the group burdened by the law."'127 Finally, the Court as-
serted that equal protection means that "a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest."'128
The Court then concluded that Colorado had pursued an ille-
gitimate end.129 "[H]omosexuals ... are put in a solitary class with
respect to transactions and relations in both the private and gov-
ernmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexu-
als, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused
by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies."'130 Furthermore, Colorado created this "solitary class" not
only without adequate justification but without any credible justi-
fication. The Court could not take the State's justifications seri-
ously given the undifferentiated, broad reach of the Amend-
ment. 13' Therefore, Colorado failed to show that it had a proper
purpose. "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homo-
sexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else."' 32
One final aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion warrants men-
tion. As the Court gave only passing attention to precedent, its
ruling was vulnerable to Justice Scalia's charge that it was with-
out foundation in the law. 3 3 One exception was the Court's effort
to distinguish Romer from cases such as Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal' 34 and Railway Express Agency v. New York' 35-- decisions
which upheld classifications that were at best loosely connected to
the state's objectives. Justice Kennedy distinguished the classify-
126. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
127. See Roiner, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 1628 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
129. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
130. Id. at 1625.
131. "The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." Id. at 1629.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a state law that discriminated between op-
ticians and licensed ophthalmologists or optometrists based on the supposition
that the regulation bore a rational relationship to public health).
135. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding a state law that discriminated between
owners and non-owners when regulating advertisements on the sides of trucks in
the name of traffic safety).
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ing statutes challenged in these cases on the basis of their re-
stricted scope and "sufficient factual context."' 36
Another exception was Justice Kennedy's discussion of Davis
v. Beason.137 He criticized the dissent's reliance on Davis for the
proposition that Amendment 2 was "within our constitutional tra-
dition." 138 In Davis, an 1890 decision, the Court observed no con-
stitutional infirmity in a territorial statute that denied voting and
office holding rights to, inter alia, persons practicing or advocating
polygamy. 139 According to Justice Kennedy, Davis did not provide
authority upholding Amendment 2.140 He aeclared that the 1969
case of Brandenburg v. Ohio14 1 invalidated Davis' holding "that
persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to
vote." ' 42 Justice Kennedy also stated that Davis' holding, allowing
deprivation of voting rights based on status, would require and
likely fail strict scrutiny analysis.143  Finally, Kennedy cited
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno144 for the
proposition that "the desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."'145
D. The Dissent
Where the majority saw animus, the dissent saw tolerance, a
polity sensitive to the interests of homosexuals. 146 This was ap-
parently because Coloradans no longer send homosexuals to jail
for sodomy. 147 What the majority saw as an analysis of a classifi-
136. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
137. 133 U.S. 333, 347 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996).
138. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
139. Davis, 133 U.S. at 346-47.
140. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 ("Davis... is not evidence that Amendment 2 is
within constitutional tradition.").
141. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing the criminal conviction of a Ku
Klux Klan leader under a criminal syndicalism statute as violative of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
142. Ronier, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. However, Justice Kennedy explicitly addressed
Davis, emphasizing that Davis' holding involving the denial of rights based on
criminal convictions was left undisturbed by Romer, and that this aspect of the
Davis holding was irrelevant to Amendment 2. Id.
143. See id. at 1628.
144. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down a federal regulation denying benefits to
unrelated members of food stamp collecting households).
145. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534) (emphasis
omitted).
146. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the fact that Colorado had
been one of the first states to repeal its sodomy laws as proof of Colorado's toler-
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cation and the end toward which it is applied, 148 the dissent saw as
an argument over policy and morality, one having little to do with
status.149 What the majority described as "sweeping and compre-
hensive," 150 the dissent described as "modest." 151
Justice Scalia authored the dissent, and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 5 2 Like the majority,
Scalia used the "special rights" issue as the starting point for con-
sidering the constitutionality of Amendment 2.153 Unlike the ma-
jority, he paid no attention to the Amendment's effects on the cov-
erage of gays, lesbians and bisexuals under civil rights
legislation 5 4 Scalia even argued that Amendment 2 did not dis-
favor Coloradans engaging in homosexual sex. 155 In support, he
offered his own characterizations of both the amendment's conse-
quences 156 and the civil rights laws. 157
In considering the consequences of Amendment 2, Justice
Scalia contended that homosexuals, like everyone else, continued
to enjoy the protections of laws of general applicability, including
laws against arbitrary discrimination. 5 8 Drawing support from
the Colorado Supreme Court, 159 Scalia maintained that "general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination would con-
tinue to prohibit discrimination on the basis of homosexual con-
duct as well."'160 Asserting that the majority "does not dispute all
ance).
148. See id. at 1627 (applying this "conventional inquiry").
149. See id. at 1633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Amendment 2 does
not prohibit favored status for homosexual individuals, but rather it prohibits fa-
vored status for homosexuality).
150. Id. at 1625.
151. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Minimizations of this order run
throughout the dissent. At the outset, Justice Scalia described Amendment 2 not
as aimed at harming homosexuals but as "rather a modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." Id. at
1629. Later on, he characterized the action taken in Amendment 2 as "the small-
est conceivable. The Court's portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to
pointless, hate-filled 'gay bashing' is so false as to be comical." Id. at 1633.
152. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 1629-31.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 1637.
156. See id. at 1630; see also infra text accompanying notes 158, 160-62.
157. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637; see also infra text accompanying note 163.
158. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (pointing to the Colorado Supreme Court's determination that Amend-
ment 2 would have no effect on laws protecting against discrimination based on
such factors as age, marital or family status, veterans status and for any legal, off-
duty conduct, such as smoking tobacco).
160. Id. Scalia notes, for example, that Amendment 2 would not affect a state
1997]
Law and Inequality
this, but assumes it to be true,"161 Scalia concluded that the ma-
jority's primary thesis was the argument "that any group is denied
equal protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to
avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general and
hence more difficult level of political decisionmaking than oth-
ers."162
In this discussion, Scalia made no mention of the impact of
Amendment 2 on coverage for homosexuals under civil rights laws.
This omission implicitly asserts that the protections of civil rights
laws are "special." That is, those not covered by civil rights laws,
i.e., most individuals, enjoy no protection from the arbitrary ac-
tions of those upon whom they depend for employment, housing
and access to public accommodations. Scalia objected to the hiring
policy of the Association of American Law Schools, for example,
because it would allow employment to be denied "because the ap-
plicant is a Republican; because he is an adulterer; because he
went to the wrong prep school or belongs to the wrong country
club, because he eats snails; [or] because is a womanizer," but not
because the applicant is homosexual. 163 By distinguishing the last
rationale, Scalia insisted, civil rights laws confer "special" status.
Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority's argument
that requiring homosexuals but no one else to use the more diffi-
cult process of constitutional amendment to obtain coverage under
civil rights laws involved a denial of equal protection. 164 According
to Scalia, "the world has never heard of such a principle, which is
why the Court's opinion is so long on emotive utterance and so
short on relevant legal citation."' 65 "Requiring that laws singling
out homosexuals be henceforth made by constitutional amendment
rather than by local or state officials no more violates the Equal
Protection Clause than would moving the power to make drug
policy or smoking policy from the locality to the state govern-
ment."'166 The Federal Constitution in fact dictates that some
law requirement "that pensions be paid to all retiring state employees with a cer-
tain length of service." What Amendment 2 prohibited, he asserted, was policies
that would provide a benefit to homosexuals that others did not receive, such as
"death benefit payments to the 'life partner' of a homosexual when it does not




163. Id. at 1637.
164. Id. at 1630-31.
165. Id. at 1630.
166. Id. at 1634. According to Scalia, the majority's position "is proved false
every time a state law prohibiting or disfavoring certain conduct is passed, because
such a law prevents the adversely affected group-whether drug addicts, or smok-
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groups such as theists will find it more difficult than others to ob-
tain favorable policy.167
Justice Scalia's position depended upon a blurring of the line
between a characteristic that attaches to a person and a charac-
teristic that attaches to a person's conduct or circumstance. His
view that the class (of gay men, lesbians and bisexuals) was de-
fined by behavior emerged most clearly a few pages later where he
argued that Amendment 2 did not "prohibit giving favored status
to people who are homosexuals; they can be favored for many rea-
sons-for example, because they are senior citizens or members of
racial minorities. But it prohibits giving them favored status be-
cause of their homosexual conduct-that is, it prohibits favored
status for homosexuality."168
The defining of a group by its behavior bears also on the
question of the applicable standard of review and the analysis of
rationality. 169 If a state could criminalize gay sex, as the Supreme
Court said it could in Bowers v. Hardwick,170 a case Justice Scalia
accused the Court of ignoring, 171 then surely it could level less on-
erous burdens on homosexuals. But even if Hardwick did not fore-
close heightened scrutiny, Scalia claimed that gays and lesbians
were not a politically powerless group that merited Court protec-
tion. 172 If rationality is the standard, the dissent argued, then
Amendment 2 should be constitutional. 173 Under the rational ba-
sis test it does not matter if the classification is imperfect, and it
would therefore be permissible even if it included some who did
not engage in the discouraged conduct but had only the inclination
to do so. 174 Scalia also took up the governance argument, calling
Colorado's process the "most democratic of procedures."'' 7 5
ers, or gun owners, or motorcyclists-from changing the policy thus established in
'each of [the] parts' of the State." Id
167. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause, applied against state action
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents those who would wish to establish a
state church from doing so without a constitutional amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
168. Id. at 1633 (emphasis added).
169. See discussion supra Part II.A.
170. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
171. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631, 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1637.
173. Id. at 1632.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 1634.
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III. Legal and Political Issues
In Romer, the Court confronted for the first time an Equal
Protection challenge to a classification based on sexual orientation.
The issue of homosexuality had been before the Court once before
in Hardwick,176 but the plaintiffs in that case had leveled a chal-
lenge based on the Due Process Clause. 177 If little else, Romer sig-
naled that there were limits to the disadvantages that could be
placed on homosexuals. But the decision provided little guidance
beyond that.
The Court considered but did not adopt the state supreme
court's position that Amendment 2 affected the fundamental right
of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process, and
therefore, required strict scrutiny. 78 It did, however, agree that
Amendment 2 made it more difficult for gays and lesbians to have
an effective voice in the political process, and that this in itself was
"a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense."1
79
The Court also did not elevate sexual orientation to a suspect
or semi-suspect status, as a number of lawyers and commentators
had urged it to do.180 Justice Kennedy did not link the decision in
Romer to the growing number of cases that purport to apply the
rationality standard, but instead conducted a review that was
clearly more searching than the traditional test required.18 ' Jus-
tice Kennedy took great care to confine the decision to its facts.
176. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177. Hardwick involved a challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute by Michael
Hardwick who had been charged, though not ultimately prosecuted, with violating
the law. Id. at 187-88. Hardwick asserted that the statute violated the right of
privacy protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. Id. at 188. Hardwick did not raise a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 198 n.8.
178. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
179. Id. at 1628.
180. This argument appeared in both the briefs on behalf of gays and lesbians
and in testimony in the trials challenging the Colorado and Cincinnati initiatives.
See e.g, Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 424-26 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (challenging a citizen-initiated amendment to
the City Charter barring laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination),
affd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th. Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1996).
Many commentators see homosexuality as a suspect classification, or at least
a semi-suspect classification. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 45, at 162-64; Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 742 (1985), Constitu-
tional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1905, 1906-07
(1993); John F. Niblock, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scru-
tiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 188-97 (1993).
181. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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The Court purposely described its analysis as "exceptional," men-
tioning twice that Amendment 2 defied traditional analysis and
was instead outside both heightened scrutiny and traditional ra-
tional basis analysis. 8 2 Because of these disclaimers, it is clear
that the Court did not settle on an approach to classifications
based merely on sexual orientation in Romner.
The opinions in this decision were remarkable in several re-
spects. What is striking about the majority's opinion is its con-
scious effort to divorce itself from existing equal protection doc-
trine. As a consequence, its action appears to be much broader
and far less grounded in the law than it actually is, and therefore
much more vulnerable to attack. What is also striking about the
majority opinion is its apparent indifference to the politics sur-
rounding the case. With the exception of the issue of "special
rights," Justice Kennedy failed to confront the dissent's argu-
ments. This will give the dissent an advantage in the dialogue
sure to follow in the lower courts, legislatures and public opinion.
The dissenting opinion was also unusual because of the extent to
which it accepted and expanded upon the political arguments
made by the anti-gay forces in the campaign for Amendment 2.
A. Equal Protection and the Enhanced Rational Basis Test
Justice Kennedy treated Amendment 2 as if it could not be
analyzed within existing equal protection doctrine. Had the
choices been only to apply either strict scrutiny or highly deferen-
tial review, that would have been true. The analysis that Justice
Kennedy chose fit neither of these models. His analysis was less
rigorous than strict scrutiny, involving no requirement of compel-
ling interests or narrowly tailored means; yet it was more search-
ing than the traditional rational basis test. Had Colorado only
been required to show that it had some conceivable basis for its ac-
tion, the Amendment almost assuredly would have survived.
183
A majority of justices still do not acknowledge that they are
applying "something more than minimum rationality review."'
18 4
182. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
183. For example, Colorado's interest in advancing religious liberty was at least
tangentially connected to the law. The trial court rejected this governmental in-
terest as a defense because it was insufficiently tailored to the ends; however, no
such precision is needed under the rational basis test. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (commenting that it is not the
function of the Court to "pass judgment on the wisdom [of the ordinance in ques-
tion]"). See also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
184. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 459 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had previously upheld similar
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In practice, however, rationality review now seems to represent
more than one standard. It looks increasingly like the sliding scale
proposed by Justice Thurgood Marshall in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams:l8 5 The less important the interest, the less likely a classifi-
cation is based upon prejudice, the more likely it is connected with
some legitimate state objective and the more deferential the re-
view. 186 The more important the interest, the higher the "degree
to which it is infringed,"'187 the more likely the classification is
based on prejudice and the stricter the review. 188 Some classifica-
tions seem more problematic than others. These include classifica-
tions involving a group that "has been subjected to a 'tradition of
disfavor" 189 and classifications that, although sometimes relevant
to a valid public purpose, most often are not.190
However, while the Court in deciding Romer did not conform
to the most deferential type of rational basis analysis, the ap-
proach it took was not without precedent. As noted, the Court has
increasingly been unwilling to abdicate totally a review which is
outside the areas of suspect or semi-suspect classifications or of
fundamental rights.' 19 This "move away from near-absolute defer-
ence to legislative judgment ' 192 has been particularly evident over
the past decade. The Court began moving away from its tradi-
tional deference in United States Department of Agriculture v-
Moreno,193 in which, purporting to apply the rational basis test, the
Court struck down a regulation which prevented unrelated indi-
viduals living together from collecting food stamps. 194 A year later
in Jimenez v. Weinberger,195 the Court invalidated a provision of
the Social Security Act which made some but not all illegitimate
children ineligible for a parent's disability benefits. 196
Since that time, several other cases have found violations of
the Equal Protection Clause while purporting to use the rational
imprecision in ordinances under mere rationality review).
185. 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (upholding a Maryland
law capping AFDC payments regardless of the size of the family).
186. See id. at 521-22.
187. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-33, at 1610.
188. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460-61 (Marshall, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 454.
191. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. See also discussion supra
Part II.A.
192. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-3, at 1445.
193. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
194. Id.




basis test. 197 In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,198 the Court
invalidated a New Mexico statute which treated Vietnam veterans
who were New Mexico residents prior to 1976 differently from
other Vietnam veterans by allowing them a $2,000 annual tax ex-
emption not available to the later residents in the state. 199
Alaska's effort to favor long-term over short-term residents met an
identical fate for similar reasons in Zobel v. Williams.200 Texas'
law barring the children of illegal aliens from receiving a free pub-
lic education was struck down in Plyer v. Doe.201 In City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 202 the Court found that the
city acted unconstitutionally when it denied a special use permit
for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded.
20 3
However, most classifications challenged under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause still were reviewed under the more deferential stan-
dard.20 4 Despite this tendency toward deference, the Court would
sometimes apply de facto heightened scrutiny, giving the Romer
decision a foundation in the law.
A strong argument can be made that Amendment 2 was just
the sort of measure for which the heightened scrutiny of the type
described by Justice Marshall was appropriate. 2 5 Gays, lesbians
197. Cf. discussion supra Part II.A (indicating that the traditional and most
commonly used rational basis test means essentially no review at all).
198. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
199. Id.
200. 457 U.S. 55, 56-58 (1982) (invalidating an Alaska law which favored long-
time residents in the distribution of income from natural resources) See also Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (invalidating a
system of assessing property tax which discriminated against recent home pur-
chasers); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that a
state cannot discriminate between out-of-state and instate insurance companies in
imposing a gross premiums tax rate); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)
(striking down a Vermont automobile use tax that favored residents over non-resi-
dents).
201. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (employing a rationality test after finding
that education was an important but not fundamental interest and that illegal ali-
ens did not constitute a suspect class).
202. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
203. Id. at 447, 450.
204. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (upholding a mandatory re-
tirement age that applied to Foreign Service Officers but not to Civil Service em-
ployees, including those stationed abroad); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding a law that gave a windfall in retirement
benefits to some workers whose service was less than others but denied the wind-
fall depending on whether they had worked for the railroad in 1974).
205. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (advocating inquiry into the "facts and circumstances behind the law").
See also supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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and bisexuals have clearly been traditionally disfavored groups.20 6
For most of the country's history, homosexuality and homosexual
sex have been seen as deviant and immoral.20 7 The medical com-
munity long viewed homosexuality as a disease. 208 Even now,
those whose homosexual orientation becomes known often face
discrimination in employment, housing, school and religion.20 9 Le-
gal discrimination against gays, lesbians and bisexuals has been
extensive. 210 Although it was argued in Romer that regardless of
the historical discrimination, gays and lesbians no longer face dis-
crimination, and that they have indeed become privileged
groups, 211 this does not reflect reality. Sexual orientation is often
still a permissible basis for discrimination both in the public and
private spheres, and many gays and lesbians still experience dis-
crimination and even violence. 212 Sexual orientation is often ir-
relevant to legitimate policy aims having little to do with the indi-
vidual's ability to function in a job or part of civic life.
With respect to Amendment 2, the degree of harm inflicted on
homosexuals was severe and far-reaching, as noted by the majority
opinion.213 It therefore was not necessary (Justice Scalia's dissent
notwithstanding) that homosexuals be politically powerless or
206. This is the argument made by those who have favored treating sexual ori-
entation as a suspect classification. See supra notes 61-68. Cass Sunstein agrees
that heightened scrutiny is appropriate for some of the same reasons but has ar-
gued against suspect classification analysis because of the belief that moving too
much beyond public opinion would generate a backlash, which in the end would
result in fewer rights for homosexuals. See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and
the Constitution, 70 IND. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1994).
207. See Stephen Zamansky, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right
to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 244, n.248 (1993).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 245 n.252 (citing Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearings on
H.R. 1454 Before the Subcoinm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Conmn.
on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1982) (statement of Rep. Paul Tson-
gas of Massachusetts).
210. Same-sex intimate relationships are not recognized by law. See Niblock,
supra note 180, at 159. That in turn has economic and social consequences.
Same-sex domestic partners are not entitled to health insurance benefits, to share
pensions, to inherit absent direct instructions in a will, to visit their partner when
ill and so on. Id. at 160. Adoptions by gay and lesbian couples are disfavored. Id.
Homosexuals are often disfavored as well in custody disputes. Id. Homosexuals
cannot openly serve in the Armed Forces. Id. at 161.
211. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. For an extensive examination of sexual orientation discrimination in em-
ployment, see Mison et al., supra note 23, at 33. See also Zamansky, supra note
207, at 244-49 (describing status issues still confronting homosexual men and
women in society); Garfield, supra note 24, at 730-32 (arguing that homosexuals
continue to face difficulties in participating in the political process).
213. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624-27.
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have low incomes in order to qualify for enhanced rational basis
review. 214 Ample factors were present to support such heightened
review. 215
Although Justice Kennedy did not invoke precedent as a
prominent feature of his analysis in Romer, he could have used a
number of the cases already mentioned to strengthen his argu-
ments. For example, Romer was not the first case to indicate that
antipathy toward the group that is harmed is an unacceptable ba-
sis for government action. When the Court invalidated the City of
Cleburne's denial of a special use permit for a group home for the
mentally retarded, it did so because it believed that the city's deci-
sion "rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded."216  Romer bears a marked resemblance to City of Cle-
burne, Moreno and Plyler, cases in which there was concern that
prejudice operated in the creation of the classification. 217
In recognizing that there is a difference between disadvan-
taging a group in the pursuit of a larger goal and disadvantaging
the group for the sole purpose of treating them differently, the
Court also had ample support in prior commentary regarding the
Equal Protection Clause.218 The interpretation of this clause has
been based on a principle of fairness: the idea that government
should treat individuals equally unless there is a legitimate and
214. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1969) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that the severity and breadth of a regulation are relevant fac-
tors triggering more searching inquiry).
215. As District Judge Spiegel wrote, "[R]elative political power cannot even be
a particularly weighty factor, let alone a controlling one. For example, it cannot be
said that males, as a group, have been relegated to such a position of political pow-
erlessness as to require special judicial protection." Equality Found. for Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Justice
Powell's comments in San Antonio Independent School Board v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973), indicate that he considered political powerlessness to be but one
of the factors triggering heightened scrutiny. Explaining why heightened scrutiny
was not necessary in Rodriguez, he noted that the inhabitants of the poor districts
were saddled with "none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28
(emphasis added). But see Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS. Aug. 8, 1996, at 44 (asserting that access to the political process is not a
fundamental right).
216. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
217. See discussion supra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
218. See e.g., ELY, supra note 45, at 159-70 (explaining the characteristics that
make a classification worthy of more searching inquiry under the Equal Protection
Clause); Kenneth L. Karst, Suspect Classifications, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND EQUALITY
285, 285-87 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1989) (giving a brief overview of classes
treated as "suspect" by the Court).
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non-prejudicial reason to do otherwise. 219 The concept of "suspect"
classifications arose in part out of the understanding that some
classifications carry a high risk of prejudicial decisionmaking. 220
As Justice White wrote in City of Cleburne, the general deference
accorded legislative choice of classifications "gives way... when a
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. 221 Justice
White reasoned that such classifications "are seldom relevant to
the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy of a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others."222
The highly deferential rational basis review which controls
most classifications was based upon concerns about governability,
federalism and democracy.2 23 But even the "theory of rationality
as governing the relation between means and ends assumes that
all legislation must have a legitimate public purpose or set of pur-
poses based on some conception of the general good."2 24 Therefore,
even under rational review, "the legislature is not entitled to pick
out a group it disfavors, declare that group to be different and then
impose a special ... burden on the disfavored group."2 25 Or in the
words of Justice Stevens, "the word 'rational'-for me at least-
includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern im-
partially." 26
It is not clear why the Court chose to ignore these cases and
commentary.22 7 The Court may have felt that treating Romer as
219. Karst, supra note 218. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizen-
ship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
220. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-2, at 1445.
221. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
222. Id.
223. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-2, at 1446-50 (mentioning considerations of gov-
ernance and democracy); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Bd. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., 44
(1973) (explaining the need to recognize the effect that claims arising under the
Equal Protection Clause have on the relationship between national and state
power under our federal system).
224. TRIBE, supra note 50, § 16-2, at 1440.
225. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 49, § 18-3, at 36.
226. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
227. The origin of the Court's position that Amendment 2 created a situation
that was unprecedented is not hard to locate. It looked much like the argument
that Laurence Tribe had advanced in an amicus brief. See Brief of Laurence H.
Tribe et al., as amici curiae in support of Respondents at 1-3, Romer v. Evans, 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039). Locating the argument's source, however, does
little to explain why it was adopted or why other clearly significant cases were ig-
nored or simply not discussed.
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exceptional confined its reach. No doubt the Justices saw the dan-
ger in taking a step that was too bold in this highly controversial
area. However, treating the decision as if it had little relationship
to precedent exposed the Court to just the type of attack that
Scalia leveled in his dissent.2 28
B. Homosexuals as an Independently Identifiable Group
The Court's opinion in Romer assumes as a premise that a
law singling out individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation
identifies them by their personal status. From this perspective the
debate over the law was whether there had been discrimination,
and if so, whether the discrimination was permissible. The dissent
challenged this framework. Justice Scalia essentially defined ho-
mosexuality as conduct rather than status, and thus depicted
Amendment 2 as aimed at conduct rather than personal iden-
tity. 229 Such a formulation profoundly alters the argument and the
outcome. If Amendment 2 merely targeted behavior, the Equal
Protection Clause would not apply, and the Constitution would be
silent unless the targeted activity was protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 0 In addition,
there could be no claim based on limiting access to the political
process.
Justice Scalia, however, was not correct. There is an appro-
priate line to be drawn between a classification based on status
and a classification based on behavior. The difference can best be
seen by reference to characteristics about which there would be no
dispute, such as race and gender. These characteristics define who
we are. They are personal traits that transcend any position on a
particular issue, and which do not change. At the other end of the
228. See supra Part II.D (discussing Justice Scalia's criticisms and arguments).
229. This offered apparent advantages for Justice Scalia because merging status
and conduct casts a more favorable light on classifications that single out homo-
sexuals for disfavorable treatment. Cf. Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard,
920 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The district court, ordering the reinstatement
into the California National Guard of First Lt. Andrew Holmes, saw the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy in a similar vein. Id. at 1534. The court in its review of that case
observed that the drafters of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy "merged the concepts
of status and conduct in an attempt to circumvent the constitutional proscrip-
tions." Joining conduct and status has been used elsewhere to defend such poli-
cies. See, e.g., Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the relationship between homosexual status and homosexual sexual
conduct).
230. This potential exposure is most apparent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.




spectrum would be legislative categories that distinguish between
types of economic activities. Whether or not a person is allowed to
organize a business in a particular manner certainly affects that
person, but it does so without any attention to the individual's per-
sonal attributes.
It is inaccurate to say that any attribute which involves be-
havior is merely a personal choice of conduct, rather than a per-
sonal trait. Some characteristics tied to personal identity can have
a behavioral component. Perhaps the clearest example of such a
trait is religion. It often affects behavior but it neither totally pre-
dicts it nor is confined to it. Religion involves choice to some ex-
tent, but for most people it is a choice that is determined by the
religious affiliation of their family. There is a sense of permanence
to it. This trait is semi-permanent, only partially a matter of
choice, potentially disconnected from behavior, and descriptive
more of who the person is than what the person does. Even when
legislation aims at behavior, which arose from choice and may be
amenable to change, it may still involve a regulation of status. 231
Sexual orientation is likewise a personal attribute that goes
beyond conduct. One need not hold that sexual orientation is im-
mutable or biologically determined to see it as a personal attribute.
Moreover, there is increasing evidence that supports the view that
sexual orientation often involves a genetic component.232 Like re-
ligion, it is often a central aspect of an individual's identity and it
is more or less permanent. 233 Sexual orientation is separate from
231. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding unconstitu-
tional a law that criminalized drug addiction, a status). Justice Powell's clerks
apparently tried to use the case to convince him to support Hardwick. See JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 520 (1994). According to Jeffries, had
Georgia "punished the status of being homosexual," the ruling would have been
applicable. "[But] that the State had not tried to do." John C. Jeffries, Changing
Times: Gay Rights, in HOMOSEXUALITY 103, 110 (Robert M. Baird & M. Katherine
Baird eds., 1995) [hereinafter Changing Times].
232. The biological determinants of sexual orientation are not yet well under-
stood, but as discussed earlier, there is a growing body of evidence that, for many,
homosexual orientation is a trait which becomes manifest early in life, is not freely
chosen, and is not amenable to change. See Zamansky, supra note 207, at 241-44
(surveying scientific evidence that homosexuality is immutable).
233. Many commentators have argued that sexual orientation should be treated
as an immutable characteristic. See id. For Samuel Marcosson, what matters is
not whether sexual orientation is immutable for all, but that it is so for many:
Admittedly, sexual orientation may not be immutable for all gay men and
lesbians. The point is that the testimony of countless people regarding
their perceptions of their sexual orientations, together with emerging evi-
dence of a link between biology and sexual orientation, makes it clear that




particular policy positions. It often bears no relationship to the
ability to participate in the general activities of social and eco-
nomic life. Such a trait suffices to define an "independently identi-
fiable group," i.e., a group whose characteristics in some real sense
transcend "the mere support for a single political issue, such as
race, gender or sexual orientation."234
Amendment 2 explicitly includes within its scope not just
people engaging in homosexual sex, but also those of homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation.235 Anti-gay forces have argued
that this is a distinction without a difference. 236 Justice Scalia en-
dorsed this view in his dissent.237 However, there are significant
periods of time in people's lives when they do not engage in any
sexual activity regardless of their orientation. The dissent glossed
over this difficulty by fusing the discussion of Amendment 2 as a
regulation of conduct with a discussion of the rationality of sin-
gling out gays, lesbians and bisexuals for disfavorable treatment
even if they have not engaged in homosexual sex.238 This approach
was improper because Amendment 2 does not directly address
homosexual orientation as it affects the workplace or any other
area of potential discrimination. Instead, it aims at an entire class
of people having an attribute arguably beyond their free choice, ir-
respective of their conduct.
Marcosson, supra note 25, at 177; see also The Constitutional Status of Sexual Ori-
entation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1302
& n.91 (1985) (arguing that uncertainty as to the origin of homosexuality favors
treatment as an immutable characteristic).
234. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 434 n.12 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
235. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b ("Neither the State of Colorado ... nor any of
its agencies ... shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships . . . [shall] entitle any person . . . [to] claim . . . discrimination.")
(emphasis added).
236. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1632 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) C'Some courts of appeals have concluded that, with respect to laws of this sort
at least, that is a distinction without a difference.") (citing Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995)).
237. Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (supporting the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado's assertion that the personal characteristics of sexual orientation, conduct,
practices and relationships are "not truly severable from one another because each
provides nothing more than a different way to identify the same class of persons")
(quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349-50 (Colo. 1994) (emphasis added)).
238. See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that because Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), established that "it is rational to criminalize the
conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a
self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct").
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C. "Special Rights" or "Equal Protection'?
The question of whether civil rights laws provide "special
rights" was as central to the constitutional controversy as it had
been to the political controversy over Amendment 2. In the con-
text of homosexual rights, the "special rights" label was particu-
larly inaccurate. As Justice Kennedy indicated, the reason that
states and localities enacted anti-discrimination laws was to
counter discriminatory practices. 239 There would be no need for
such laws if general prohibitions against arbitrary action were suf-
ficient to put all citizens on an equal footing. The "special rights"
language used by anti-gay forces suggests that gays, lesbians and
bisexuals were seeking rights that others did not have. In fact,
what they were asking for was decision-making in which sexual
orientation would not count.240 Put differently, what homosexuals
sought when they argued for protection against discrimination was
to be treated like everyone else.
One argument that supports the notion of "special rights" is
that an employer has a right to run his business as he pleases, and
that "a person can ordinarily be fired for a wide range of reasons
but not for being a member of a protected group."241 As a result,
"the government is choosing to favor the equality-based right of
one person over the liberty-based right of another-thus conferring
a 'special right' for the former."242 This argument is flawed in at
least two respects. First, as the Court pointed out in Romer, com-
mon law limited the so-called private right to discriminate. 243 Sec-
ond, the comparison between employer and employee is one be-
tween differently situated people, and thus not relevant to equal
protection analysis. The civil rights laws were passed in response
to discriminations that the majority of people do not face. 244 Such
239. Id. at 1624-25.
240. See id. at 1626 ('It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad lan-
guage of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection
of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental
and private settings."). For example, Amendment 2 might be construed to strip
homosexuals of such general protections as judicial review of agency action under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id.
241. Schacter, supra note 38, at 304-05.
242. Marcosson, supra note 25, at 145.
243. Romer, 116. S. Ct. at 1625.
244. See, e.g., Sperling v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 472 n.14 (3d Cir.
1994) (asserting that many civil rights laws exist to ban age discrimination in em-
ployment); cf. Casey v. City of Cabool, Mo., 12 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1993)
(articulating Congress' intent regarding civil rights actions as including the desire
to shift the cost of attorneys' fees to guilty parties and thus enable an individual to
act as a "private attorney general").
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laws merely put groups with recognized disadvantages on an equal
footing with other groups.
Whatever could be said for the "special rights" view regarding
private discrimination loses considerable force when applied to the
government. This is because government has no cognizable liberty
interest against which the interest in equal treatment competes.
Thus Justice Kennedy's observation that Amendment 2 was "[n]ot
confined to the private sphere" is important.245 In fact, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court itself gave two examples. 246
Amendment 2 mischaracterizes anti-discrimination laws as
vehicles for preferences and quotas.247 It purports to right these
wrongs by barring laws that take account of any sexual orienta-
tion, whether homosexual, bisexual or straight, as a basis for deci-
sion.248 The Court might have pointed out that striking this
seemingly neutral language had little, if any, connection to quotas
or preferences. By ignoring the affirmative action mischaracteri-
zation, the Court's opinion failed to avert "the public's hostility to-
ward the most powerful symbol of civil rights backlash,"249 and
thus compromised some of its persuasiveness.
D. Animus/Moral Disapproval as a Basis for
Discrimination
The dissent's most compelling argument turns out to be one
that was downplayed in the political campaign for Amendment 2:
that discrimination is in fact permissible. Justice Scalia claimed
first that that the Court's position in striking down Amendment 2
was inconsistent with its willingness to allow States to criminalize
homosexual sodomy as it had in Bowers v. Hardwick.250 According
to Justice Scalia the removal of homosexuals from protected status
was certainly less severe than actually punishing them for their
245. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
246. Id. (The State Supreme Court cited two examples of protections in the
government sphere that are now rescinded and may not be reintroduced."). The
rescinded protections had prohibited discrimination in the areas of state employ-
ment and state colleges. Id. (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo.
1993)).
247. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (mentioning preferences and quotas explic-
itly despite their tenuous relation to anti-discrimination laws).
248. See Marcosson, supra note 25, at 141-42 (pointing out that such classifica-
tions are, in a sense, facially neutral).
249. Schacter, supra note 38, at 304.
250. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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sexual conduct, as had been allowed earlier. 251 Under this rea-
soning, Amendment 2 helped Coloradans express their disapproval
of homosexual orientation at a level clearly permitted by the Con-
stitution.
Bowers v. Hardwick 52 was a due process case, however, and
there is some question whether Hardwick would have come out
the way it did if an equal protection claim had been made. 253 As
one prominent constitutional scholar has written, "[b]ecause of the
independence of the lines of analysis under the two clauses, the
conclusion in Hardwick does not dispose of the issue. 254 But even
if the Court were to conclude that a state may punish homosexual
and not heterosexual sodomy, it does not follow that a state may
broadly disadvantage anyone who might merely be inclined to
commit such sodomy. It would be a violation of due process to
punish someone for an act they have not yet committed.25 5 Also,
the penalty exacted under Amendment 2 was arguably more se-
vere than those under the criminal laws. Amendment 2 was very
broad and burdened gays and lesbians in a vast array of activities.
Additionally, to the extent that the Romer Court relied on the
right to political participation in reaching its decision, the Hard-
wick case had no relevance.
Similar objections can be made to Justice Scalia's analogy to
polygamy. 25 6 Society can indeed enact laws which punish polyga-
251. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissi-
ble for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.").
252. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
253. The Court's rejection of the due process claim included a comment that no
equal protection issue had been presented, thus leaving open the possibility that
such a claim might be mounted in the future. Id. at 196 n.8. Obviously, the fact
that a bare majority (5-4) decided Hardwick enhances this possibility. The major-
ity, moreover, was particularly unstable. See Changing Times, supra note 231, at
105-18 (pointing to Justice Powell's ambivalence throughout the deliberations and
his later recantation). Had equal protection arguments been presented in Hard-
wick, the outcome may well have been different.
254. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161,
1163 (1988).
255. The Court is currently grappling with whether it is permissible to restrain
sex offenders who appear to be a threat to the community. See In re Care and
Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), cert. granted, Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). A decision for the State would probably character-
ize the restraint as noncriminal and non-penal. It would nevertheless be based on
predicted future behavior, though in circumstances where the State's interest was
compelling.




mists, but such laws involve conduct, not inclination. While most
gays and lesbians are likely to engage in sexual acts with persons
of the same sex, surely there are some who do not, just as there
are some heterosexuals who do not engage in sex. There are in
fact many gays and lesbians who are not sexually active at any
particular time. The Court did make clear that a law disadvan-
taging those of polygamous orientation-those who would practice
polygamy if they could-would not withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.257
Regardless of precedent, there remains the broader assertion
that discrimination is permissible for no reason other than the
majority's desire to disapprove of homosexuality. 258 This argu-
ment concerns the proper reading of the Constitution. One side
assumes, as did Justice White in Hardwick, that it is "legitimate
for a state to impose a disadvantage on a particular group just to
express the majority's moral contempt for that group's practices,
even when there is no other proper purpose."259 The other side be-
lieves that the state can impose disadvantage only in the face of
actual harm from the group's activities. 260 Even if one accepts the
former position, though, the argument is not compelling in the
context of homosexual rights. As noted previously, Amendment 2
burdened not just homosexual conduct, but homosexual orienta-
tion as well.2 6 1 Simple fairness demands that "people should not
be ill-treated based on a characteristic or status they are unable to
257. Id. at 1628.
258. The dissent erroneously characterized the Court's position as having
"placed the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias." Id. at 1629. Had
this characterization been accurate, sexual orientation would have been elevated
to a suspect classification. See supra notes 61-63 (discussing the importance of
such a classification with respect to the standard of review).
259. Dworkin, supra note 215, at 49 (characterizing Justice White's opinion in
Hardwick).
260. See id. (characterizing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer). The dissent in
Roiner argued that what Justice Kennedy called "animus" was nothing more than
a statement of moral disapproval. Id. (citing Romner, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Kennedy did not respond to this part of the dissent, possibly
because the majority did not hold to one view. It is not unknown for justices who
join an opinion to do so for reasons that are quite different. This often results in
an opinion that is not reasoned as tightly as it otherwise might have been. See,
e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 702-05 (1975) (pointing
to the terse, bland reasoning expressed in the controversial but unanimous opinion
of Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
261. See Part III.B supra for arguments that orientation, not conduct, is the
correct focus for analyzing homosexual discrimination issues.
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change. '"262 And there is increasing evidence "that at least for
many gays, sexual orientation is immutable." 263
IV. An Alternate Approach-Participation in the Political
System as a Fundamental Right
Thus far, this Comment has argued that the Court's decision
in Romer v. Evans was justified as a matter of law, but that its le-
gal analysis would have been stronger if it had not treated Romer
as an anomaly. There was ample precedent available within ex-
isting equal protection case law. 264 Such omissions are often of in-
terest only to legal scholars, but this was a highly visible case that
will probably have significant repercussions. Weakness in the
majority opinion can result in insufficient guidance to lower courts
and to other political actors. 265 It also can harm the Court's influ-
ence by making the Court appear unprincipled.
As noted earlier, the Court actually used an enhanced ra-
tional basis review in its Romer decision, although it did not say so
explicitly. 266 Although this was defensible, the Court would have
had an easier time had it followed the Colorado Supreme Court
and declared that there was a fundamental right to equal partici-
pation in the political process which was limited by Amendment 2.
Because such an approach involves a proven constitutional argu-
ment, it would have been stronger politically.
A. Position of the Colorado Supreme Court
The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis of Amendment 2
started from the proposition that "the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution protects the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process. '267 "Any legislation or
state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by
'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons must be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny."2 68 The court determined that:
262. Marcosson, supra note 25, at 174.
263. Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted).
264. See supra Part III.A (providing several applications of enhanced rational
basis review).
265. See TRIBE, supra note 50, § 1-9, at 15-17 (arguing that the fundamental
indeterminacy of constitutional interpretation has been a significant contributor to
the Court's role as the definitive interpreter of the Constitution).
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994) (quoting Evans v. Romer,




Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a targeted
class is prohibited from obtaining legislative, executive, and
judicial protection or redress from discrimination absent the
consent of a majority of the electorate through the adoption of
a constitutional amendment. Rather than attempting to
withdraw anti-discrimination issues as a whole from state and
local control, Amendment 2 singles out one form of discrimi-
nation and removes its redress from consideration by the
normal political processes.
269
Accordingly, the court applied strict judicial scrutiny, not be-
cause homosexuals constituted a suspect class, but because the
right affected was fundamental. The court then held that Colo-
rado had not offered sufficient justification to sustain the amend-
ment.270 The U.S. Supreme Court did not rely heavily on this fun-
damental rights analysis; however, Justice Kennedy's reference to
the discriminatory nature of Amendment 2 and the obstacles it
imposed on the ability of gays, lesbians and bisexuals to influence
the political process reflects at least a limited recognition that the
state Supreme Court's position had some merit.27 1 Not supris-
ingly, Justice Scalia rejected this approach.272
Despite commentary to the contrary, the state court's position
did not involve a novel proposition. 273 The U.S. Supreme Court
consistently has been concerned when the State restructures its
government in a way that makes it more difficult for an
"independently identifiable group"274 to have influence over the
machinery of government. The Court's effort to assure a fair po-
litical process can be seen in a number of its voting rights cases. 275
269. Id.
270. For a discussion of the Colorado Supreme Court's position see supra Part
II.B.
271. Ronier, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
272. Id. at 1634-35.
273. Ronald Dworkin's analysis necessarily accepts the argument that there is
no difference between identifiable groups and independently identifiable groups.
See Dworkin, supra note 215, at 44 (arguing against the Colorado Supreme Court's
holding that Amendment 2 implicated a fundamental right).
274. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971) (using this terminology to signify
particular minority groups-racial, religious or otherwise-subjected to Virginia's
discriminatory voting policy).
275. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (indicating that political ger-
rymanders might contravene equal protection principles); Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating a candidate filing fee as applied to indigents); Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down a state plan that lim-
ited voting in a school district to property owners or people with children in the
schools); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down a requirement that
new parties file petitions nine months prior to the election); Reynolds v. Simms,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating an apportionment scheme that failed to provide
for one person/one vote, noting that vote dilution debased democracy).
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The Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to protect
against not only denials of the vote but also dilution of the vote. In
Goinillion v. Lightfoot,276 for example, the Court overturned Ala-
bama's efforts to redraw voting districts based on its understand-
ing that the purpose was to dilute the political power of African
Americans.
The argument that these protections are confined to suspect
classifications is inaccurate. It is true that cases in which the
Court has invalidated initiatives have involved racial classifica-
tions;277 however, the Court's language has suggested a broader
reading. Consider the Court's observation that "the State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by making it more diffi-
cult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any per-
son's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another
of comparable size."278  The Court has also used the phrase
"independently identifiable groups," 279 which could certainly be
applied to homosexuals. Finally, although James v. Valtierra
280 is
generally used to support the notion that only racial classifications
are forbidden, James is distinguishable from Romer because it did
not deal with an independently identifiable group.
28
'
The principle that the State should not make it more difficult
for some citizens than others to influence the political process is
276. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating efforts to redraw the voting districts in
and around Tuskeegee, Alabama, which were intended to dilute the voting power
of African Americans).
277. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)
(invalidating a state initiative that shifted power to remedy de facto racial segre-
gation from the City of Seattle to the State of Washington) and Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down a city charter amendment adopted by a
citizen initiative which made the adoption of housing anti-discrimination legisla-
tion more difficult).
278. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393.
279. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5, 7 (1971) (linking the violation of the
Equal Protection Clause to a voting provision's propensity to "fence ouf' a sector of
the population).
280. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of making it more dif-
ficult for low-income individuals to obtain housing).
281. There is language in James that suggested that the Court saw low-income
individuals as different because they did not form a permanent, identifiable group
but were rather one of many "diverse and shifting groups that make up the Ameri-
can people." Id. (emphasis added); see also Niblock, supra note 180, at 187 (noting
that many commentators treat James "as an aberration, and not as a guide to how
the Court should evaluate laws placing discriminatory political burdens on identi-
fiable groups") (citation omitted). It is also important to keep in mind that James
preceded Davis v. Bandeiner, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), a decision in which a plurality of
Justices indicated that the systematic exclusion of a political party from equal ac-




not confined to cases involving initiatives or referendum votes. It
also lies at the heart of the reapportionment cases where the man-
dated equality is unrelated to the individual's membership in a
suspect class. 282 The Court's position with regard to political ger-
rymandering is also relevant. Though the state has authority to
draw district lines, it may not do so in a way that systematically
"degrade[s] ... a group of voters' influence on the political process
as a whole."283
B. The Political Dimension-Advantages of the
Fundamental Rights Approach
The fundamental rights approach has a number of advan-
tages over the enhanced rational basis review which the Court
used in Romer. Many voters in Colorado supported Amendment 2
because they believed that it prevented gays and lesbians from ob-
taining special advantages. 284 This characterization of Amend-
ment 2 was dismissed by the Court as "implausible."285 As a re-
sult, the Court was accused of being elitist and undemocratic. 286
The accusation with the greatest potential of doing political
damage to the Court was the charge that it had usurped the peo-
ple's rightful role. 287 The political danger is well illustrated in an
editorial in the Chicago Tribune, which claims both sympathy for
homosexuals and a lack thereof for the Court's action.288 Even
though the newspaper admitted that "homosexuals have been
badly treated for most of American history and that the law should
try to rectify that injustice," 289 it asserted that Romer was "a defeat
282. See Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding unconstitutional Ala-
bama's state legislative apportionment, and in so doing, introducing the one-
person, one-vote standard and noting that vote dilution debased democracy).
283. Davis, 478 U.S. at 110.
284. Marcosson, supra note 25, at 138 n.6.
285. Evans v. Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996).
286. See id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Rhetoric matters in politics;
it affects how people think about problems. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC
USES OF POLITICS 114-30 (1985) (examining how language affects politics).
"Democracy" is a word of some particular potency. See also ROBERT A. DAHL,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 2 (1989). The notion of majority rule is particularly
fundamental in the United States, though it at times runs counter to belief in in-
dividual rights. The charge that the people's power has been usurped thus threat-
ens the legitimacy of the action and the agency that took it.




for democratic governance that may ultimately inflame rather
than erode opposition to gay civil rights."290
Democracy is a word of considerable political potency. It is
generally accepted by Americans that the people should in some
sense rule, and that actions against the majority carry a presump-
tion of illegitimacy. However, it is not always easy to reconcile the
various rights, including minority rights, which we consider to be
part of democratic government. Nor is it easy to determine which
majority in a particular situation should be controlling. In Romer,
for example, the city ordinances of Aspen, Denver and Boulder
protecting homosexuals from discrimination and repealed by
Amendment 2 were passed by normal democratic means.291 It cer-
tainly could be argued that, at least for those localities, anti-
discrimination laws represented the true will of the people.
But the scope of a conflict often determines its outcome. The
defeated have an incentive to bring in other participants to shift
the balance of power. 292 In Colorado the loss in some arenas,
brought about by local majorities, led anti-gay forces to seek a
statewide majority with a different political composition. Con-
ceivably a still larger majority might someday be found, composed
of the nation at large, which could if it chose enact national civil
rights laws overruling legislation at the state level. Political struc-
tures establish a hierarchy of power, with larger majorities domi-
nating smaller ones, but there is no moral imperative within
democratic theory that this must be the case. While democratic
theory asserts that "the people" must in some sense govern or hold
those who do govern accountable, the theory does not define who
"the people" should be.
Even as decided, Romer was not really undemocratic. The
will of local majorities was upheld in the Court. It could be argued
as well, that to the extent that the campaign for Amendment 2
misled voters, the vote was not really a true reflection of what the
people of Colorado wished. 293 However, there is a political dimen-
sion to U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as discussed earlier, and the
influence of the Court is weakened when it loses public confidence
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of
Amendment 2 by referendum and the importance of this fact in the litigation).
292. E.E. SCHATTSNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 1-19 (1960) (discussing
the difficulty in taking such steps to balance the power dynamic if one lacks the
necessary resources and support).




in the legitimacy of its decisions. The use of the fundamental
rights approach in Romer would have been clearer to the public
than the reasoning actually employed by the Court. Moreover, it
would have been just as valid as a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation. Most importantly, the fundamental rights approach
would have emphasized the Court's commitment to democratic
processes and would have blunted the fact that it had overruled a
statewide referendum.
In addition, the fundamental rights approach would have
avoided a number of other legal and political problems in the
Court's equal protection analysis. In holding that the State could
not act out of "animus," the Court invited future litigation based
on the motivation behind laws, which is often very difficult to de-
termine. 294 The fundamental rights approach would have avoided
such questions. The fundamental rights approach does not involve
homosexual sexual conduct at all, and so the Bowers opinion used
by the dissent would no longer be relevant-295 Finally, such an ap-
proach would have allowed the Court to avoid the charge that it
had taken sides in the "culture wars,"296 since it would merely
have been defending the openness of the democratic process.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans was correct
in its outcome. The Court acted clearly within the tradition of
keeping the political system fair. Amendment 2 deliberately sin-
gled out gays, lesbians and bisexuals regardless of their actual
conduct, and placed them at a disadvantage in obtaining the bene-
fits of society that other citizens take for granted. It was correctly
overturned because it denied homosexuals the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Constitution.
Romer could have been argued more convincingly, however,
either by providing more explicit support for the use of the en-
hanced rational basis test or by using a standard of review based
upon fundamental rights. Not only would the Court have been
better able to defend its holding against legal attacks, such as
those raised by Justice Scalia in the dissent, but it also would have
294. Relying on impermissible motivations has been widely criticized at various
times by many commentators and Justices. The criticism made here is not con-
fined to those who hold any particular interpretative perspective. See, e.g., TRIBE,
supra note 50, § 12-6, at 821-25 (indicating some of the issues and objections that
have been leveled).
295. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text; see also Part III.D.
296. Evans v. Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
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been better immunized from public criticism. In this high-profile
and politically important case, it was particularly important that
the public not come away with the notion that an amendment
which purported only to bar "special rights" and "preferences," and
which had been voted on directly by the people of Colorado in a
referendum, was then blocked by an elitist Court promoting its
own policy views. At the least, Justice Kennedy should have con-
fronted the "special rights" argument more directly, in terms more
easily understood by the public and by the news media.
At the same time, it is important to remember that any po-
litical damage to the Court caused by Romer is likely to be limited.
The Court's action, while invalidating a citizen referendum, still
showed support for a form of majority rule. It also did not step be-
yond how most Americans believe that gays, lesbians and bisexu-
als should be treated.2 97 Romer was also a narrow decision, de-
spite the broad reach of the amendment which was struck down.
Specifically, the Court was urged by gay-rights supporters to de-
clare sexual orientation to be a suspect classification, and it did not
do so. If it had taken this course, its decision would have been
"clearer-and more controversial,"298 and would have resulted in
its injecting itself directly into such emotional and politically
charged "social" issues as single-sex marriage. The Court may well
have wished to avoid such controversy, at least for the present.
297. Data show that there is strong public support for homosexuals regarding
equal access to jobs, housing and public accommodations, but opposition on other
issues such as same-sex marriage. See Marcosson, supra note 25, at 138 n.6
(discussing the language used in Amendment 2 and the public's reaction to some of
its specific components).
298. Greenburg, supra note 17, at 4.
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